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I analyze the equilibrium level of liquidity and its relevance for the allocation of credit, when
the notion of liquidity is related to private information. The general equilibrium analysis
yields the following main implications: ﬁrstly, it provides an explanation of procyclical
liquidity even in the presence of security endogeneity; secondly, it illustrates how govern-
ment debt, by providing liquidity to an otherwise illiquid private market, encourages rather
than “crowds out” private investment; thirdly, it oﬀers a well deﬁn e dn o t i o no fs e c u r i t i e s ’
value, the liquidity of which is endogenously enhanced by the arrangements within ﬁnancial
markets.
The approach jointly analyzes the three factors crucial to liquidity: (1) its level is
endogenously determined through equilibrium pricing while entrepreneurs choose which
security to issue; (2) the introduction of government debt has the two-fold eﬀect of directly
providing liquidity to entrepreneurs and indirectly inﬂuencing the type of securities they
issue in equilibrium; (3) ﬁnancial markets develop arrangements to allow the beneﬁcial
employment of securities, not only physical assets, as collateral (ﬁnancial pyramiding).
JEL Classiﬁcation: E22, E44
Keywords: Liquidity, Collateral, Business Cycle, Government Debt, Financial Arrange-
ments, Tranching, Financial Pyramiding1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The liquidity of an economy is considered one of its deﬁning features. Liquidity shortages
are often associated with poor economic performance and asset pricing is believed to be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the liquidity available to investors1. It is therefore important to
study what determines the equilibrium level of liquidity of an economy. This paper presents
a general equilibrium characterization of the notion of liquidity and its determinants. The
latter include the nature of the optimal security design in the private sector, the presence
of government debt, and the available ﬁnancial arrangements2. The result of this enquiry
provides an explanation of the relation between liquidity and the allocation of credit, the
correlation between liquidity and the state of economy and of the economic policies that
aﬀect it.
Following Eisfeldt (2004), the liquidity of a security is deﬁned by the ease of translating
its future value into current market prices. A security is thus more liquid the closer its
market price to its actual (discounted) expected payment and - similarly - we say that the
economy’s liquidity increases with the liquidity of its securities3.I n r e a l i t y ,t h e r e m a y b e
diﬀerent reasons for the existence of a wedge between the actual - full information - value
and the market price of a security4. In this work, I will focus exclusively on informational
asymmetries.
The ﬁrst distinctive feature of this economy is that agents have private information
about the quality of the technologies they own when they are entrepreneurs. For simplicity
there are only two kinds of technologies, whose outcomes are stochastic, and which can be
ranked at the time investment is undertaken in terms of expected production. All agents are
equal in terms of preferences and endowments but, in each period, some individuals receive
an investment opportunity. When an agent faces an investment opportunity he becomes an
entrepreneur: some entrepreneurs receive the better technology while the others receive the
worse one. The agents who do not face an investment opportunity in a given period will
be referred to as consumers. Each entrepreneur desires to borrow in order to increase his
private investment above his own endowment and portfolio. In these economies, borrowing
is channeled through the issuance of securities that are traded in anonymous capital markets.
By purchasing securities, consumers lend funds to entrepreneurs. The security price
consumers are willing to pay is an increasing function of the security’s expected payment. I
1See Eisfeldt (2004) for the former and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998), (2001), Huang (2003), Allen and Gale (2003) for the latter.
2This study does not explicitly model ﬁnancial intermediation, even though, since Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983), an ample literature has stressed the relation between banks and liquidity. Given our construct
though, introducing banks would not make any diﬀerence unless they were endowed with a superior con-
tractual/screening technology.
3Quoting holmstrom and Tirole (2001), footnote 1: "Liquidity [...] does not [only] refer to the ease with
which assets can be resold, but rather to [...] the value of ﬁnancial instruments used to transport wealth
across time [...]."
4Johnson (2004) stresses that the ﬁnance literature highlights at least three distinct sources for
(il)liquidity: search costs, inventory risks and asymmetric information. Here I focus on a reinterpreta-
tion of the last. Morris and Shin (2004) base their notion of liquidity on private information, though not
about the value of the traded object.
1assume that the expected delivery is in turn positively related to the quality of the technol-
ogy of the issuer so that ﬁrms with better technologies issue securities with higher expected
deliveries, ceteris paribus. Since entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality
of the technology they own, the payoﬀ of a security becomes uncertain. This uncertainty
is ultimately responsible for the diﬀerence between the actual value of a security and its
market price, i.e. its liquidity. In conclusion, by aﬀecting securities market prices, the
entrepreneur’s private information aﬀects his ability to borrow and then to invest.
The second distinctive feature of this economy is that entrepreneurs choose what kind
of security they issue. In reality ﬁrms issuing securities can oﬀer a wide array of contingent
payments5. This observation is reinterpreted here by allowing ﬁrms to design securities
diﬀering from each other by the likelihood and extent of their default. This construction
establishes a large security space for entrepreneurs. When a security is issued, the entrepre-
neur decides how much "collateral" is attached to it6. The more collateral a security carries,
the higher is its expected payment7. Deciding what kind of security to issue, entrepreneurs
compare the relation between the market price and expected delivery (i.e. its liquidity)
across each diﬀerent security8. But since collateral is limited, increasing the per security
collateral reduces the number of securities an entrepreneur can issue. Therefore there is a
trade-oﬀ between the equilibrium liquidity of a security and the collateral it requires, the
result of which determines the optimal security. Unlike most literature addressing liquidity
- but in line with Demarzo and Duﬃe (1999), Geanakoplos (2003) and Demarzo (2003) -
the asset structure thus arises endogenously.
I assume that consumers are able to observe the amount of collateral attached to each
security - thus its deﬁning feature - but are unable to observe its quality. This inability
comes from the fact that the value of each unit of collateral is an increasing function of the
quality of the underlying technology, which is private information. Each security price thus
reﬂects the degree of uncertainty associated with the mix of entrepreneurs issuing a speciﬁc
security. Diﬀerent securities may therefore carry diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty and their
demands take this fact into account in the determination of equilibrium prices.
In fact, at one extreme of the security space, we have securities characterized by collat-
eral level high enough to insure no default irrespective of whom the issuer is. A consumer
choosing to buy such a security would face no relevant informational asymmetry and the
equilibrium price would reﬂect it; if instead the collateral level implies some default for at
least one kind of technology, then the buyer knows he may be purchasing a security issued
5Equity, bonds, indexation and default are only the main instances of how ﬁrms design contingent pay-
ments.
6This construction of the security space is similar to Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) and Geanakoplos
(2003). For the moment it is convenient to keep the notion of collateral vague and focus on the properties
we impose on it. Later on we will identify it with the capital that each entrepreneur is building at the time
of investment.
7What we call collateral here is not some unambiguous stock of wealth (e.g. gold or dollars). It is rather
a factor of production, as we will see, whose value is strictly related to the performance and productivity of a
ﬁrm. Notice the similarity between this notion of collateral and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishnamurthy
(2000) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001).
8In the context of competitive markets, this comparizon is non trivial and will be addressed through the
adoption of a tremble “on the market” argument as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).
2by entrepreneurs with low quality technologies. If entrepreneurs with diﬀerent technologies
issue identical securities - in terms of collateral - the market displays features of “Lemons
market”: the market price reﬂects the inability to screen across diﬀerent qualities of securi-
ties. The resulting (liquidity) premium charged to the sellers of relatively better securities
discourages the issuance of good quality securities while it encourages the issuance of bad
quality ones9.
It is therefore natural to identify the imperfect liquidity of the economy as a pooling
equilibrium in the security space. When the equilibrium is pooling, every entrepreneur
issues securities with the same level of collateral. This implies that low quality securities
are subsidized since they are traded at a price strictly above their expected delivery. By
the same token, I will identify a perfectly liquid economy by a separating equilibrium. If,
anticipating the illiquidity of a pooling equilibrium, entrepreneurs with better technologies
issue securities with relatively higher level of collateral, then each consumer can track back
the quality of a security simply by observing the level of collateral attached to it. It is crucial
to observe that, in the attempt to signal themselves, high quality entrepreneurs decrease the
number of securities they can issue, their maximum leverage, and become more borrowing
constrained. Therefore, in a separating equilibrium, entrepreneurs are willing to accept the
cost of decreasing their maximum leverage in order to obtain a price closer to the expected
delivery of their securities, i.e. increase their liquidity.
The trade-oﬀ between the level of collateral necessary to solve the informational asym-
metry (the leverage eﬀect) and the degree of subsidization entailed in the pooling equilib-
rium (the price eﬀect) is ultimately responsible for the presence of one type of equilibrium
over the other. But because of the informational asymmetry between entrepreneurs and
consumers, in both pooling and separating equilibria the securities issued by entrepreneurs
with better technologies face worse borrowing terms10. Therefore better technologies are
adversely selected. Relating the liquidity of a security to its suitability in ﬁnancing private
investment, the equilibrium level of liquidity has become a crucial factor in the allocation
of credit, and thus private investment, across diﬀerent technologies.
The proposed general equilibrium perspective is then directed at analyzing the condi-
tions suﬃcient to guarantee a pooling equilibrium in the security space. This equilibrium
is central to our analysis because an illiquid economy is deﬁned by it. In signalling games,
p o o l i n ge q u i l i b r i at e n dt ob es e n s i t i ve to how optimistic agents are about oﬀ-equilibrium
choices (securities in our case)11. I address this issue and show that our pooling equilibria
a r ei nf a c tr o b u s tt oo p t i m i s t i co ﬀ-equilibrium expectations, provided that the share of good
9Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) studies the relation between liquidity and asset pricing in an economy
with both liquid and illiquid assets. Their notion of liquidity relates to limited commitment rather than
private information. Their perspective allows to reinterpret asset pricing and monetary policy in interesting
ways. This paper stresses instead the fact that, in the case of securities, the liquidity of an asset should be
considered the result of an optimizing behavior and is, therefore, endogenous. This allows to discuss the
relation between liquidity and the business cycle and reinterpret the role of government debt.
10In a pooling equilibrium, high quality securities "subsidize" the price of low quality ones. In a separating
equilibrium, entrepreneurs issuing high quality securities can sell less of them since each entails strictly more
collateral.
11See Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) and Martin (2004) for a discussion about the "fragility" of pooling
equilibria in the context of insurance models.
3quality entrepreneurs in the population is high enough. The intuition behind the existence
of pooling equilibria is simple, bearing the basic trade-oﬀ in mind. The pooling equilibrium
entails a cost (the price eﬀect) for entrepreneurs with the best technology. If this cost is
high enough, then they deviate and a liquid separating equilibrium emerges. But the higher
is the share of high quality ﬁrms, the higher is the pooling price and the lower is the cost
of the pooling equilibrium they bear. Therefore a suﬃciently high price makes high quality
entrepreneurs not willing to deviate and thus supports the pooling equilibrium12.T h er o -
bustness of pooling equilibria is ensured by the local failure of the "single crossing property"
consequence of our setup. Good quality entrepreneurs may attempt to distinguish them-
selves by issuing securities with lower expected default (i.e. higher expected payments).
But since the capital is more productive - and thus more valuable - the better is the tech-
nology, the expected delivery of securities issued by good quality entrepreneurs increases
relatively faster than that of bad quality securities as the capital that guarantees repayment
increases. The positive correlation between capital/collateral value and technology’s quality
- a reasonable assumption in our opinion - is ultimately responsible for the local failure of
the "single crossing property". This local failure is suﬃcient to ensure robustness since it
restrains good entrepreneurs from abandoning the pooling equilibrium, even in the presence
of "optimistic" beliefs about oﬀ equilibrium securities.
Once the robustness of illiquid pooling equilibria has been established, we turn to the
evidence suggesting that the liquidity of the economy tends to be procyclical. The provision
of an empirically consistent explanation in the presence of security endogeneity is not at all
obvious. One may be tempted to say that when the economic outlook looks grim, good qual-
ity ﬁrms want to avoid the additional liquidity cost connected to the pooling equilibrium.
Thus a stronger incentive toward a liquid separating equilibrium would emerge. This would
be an explanation at odds with the evidence. A simple reinterpretation of the proposed
framework provides an empirically consistent explanation. When the economy is booming,
the contingency with low production becomes less likely. Thus both production technologies
tend to deliver more production, in expectation, at any given level of investment. Since the
contingency with low production, where default is greater, becomes less likely, expected
deliveries of diﬀerent quality securities tend to become closer, even for securities character-
ized by low level of collateral. High quality ﬁrms are then encouraged to deviate out of the
pooling since the cost of separation decreases. Eventually a separating equilibrium emerges
when the economy booms and vice versa when the economy is in recession. Following this
argument, it is possible to provide an explanation of procyclical liquidity where the economy
switches from liquid separating equilibria during good times to illiquid pooling equilibria
during bad times.
Moreover, the framework provides a novel interpretation of the role of government debt
in crowding “in” private investment13. Since government bonds do not require the provision
of collateral, and under the assumption that they provide the security with the least infor-
mational asymmetry in the economy, a positive amount of government debt raises aggregate
12Our methodology is very close to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).
13This view was already suggested by Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Gorton and
Huang (2004) is diﬀerent since it focuses on banks bailouts.
4investment. Government bonds are ideal candidates to transfer wealth to the future, besides
what is already provided by private securities. In fact, an economy such as the one described
here faces two main problems: the ﬁrst is the cost of using the available collateral to guar-
antee securities’ repayment; the second problem is the lack of an instrument to increase
the saving of current period consumers who may face an investment opportunity in the
future. Current consumers may become entrepreneurs in the future. When this happens,
they may ﬁnd themselves borrowing constrained. They thus ﬁnd it convenient to purchase
government bonds today, as an additional store of value, in order to increase the funds at
their disposal tomorrow. By relaxing the collateral constraint in an informationally eﬃcient
way, positive government debt crowds in private investment. I will show that the positive
eﬀect of government debt over equilibrium investment is potentially twofold. In fact the
introduction of government debt, by relaxing the collateral constraint, not only increases
private investment directly but builds an incentive to move the equilibrium of the economy
toward separation. The liquidity eﬀect of government debt on equilibrium securities is novel
in the literature and underlines the diﬀerent purposes that government debt serves in the
economy.
Finally, I will show that an additional beneﬁcial role is played by the possibility of
using securities, besides physical capital, as collateral when sellers have superior information
about their value. I will name this arrangement ﬁnancial pyramiding. I argue that part
of the extensive security creation we observe in ﬁnancial markets arises to address the
informational asymmetry present in the market for the securities resale. The reasoning is
straightforward: if individuals use the securities they own as collateral instead of reselling
them, they may avoid paying the liquidity premium the market imposes because of the
private information. Allowing pyramiding reduces the cost of resale for the owner of good
securities and therefore may increase the equilibrium level of investment. This is also
reﬂected in the securities issued in equilibrium: since the asymmetric information in the
resale market is less severe, the level of adverse selection in investment is thereby reduced.
This interpretation of the role of ﬁnancial markets can be traced back to the intuition of
Arrow (1964): as ﬁnancial markets arise to add missing markets or replace existing ones, so
ﬁnancial arrangements are interpreted as instruments tackling the imperfections imposed
by the possibility of default.
1.1 Related Literature
The focus of this paper is macroeconomic though this line of enquiry has the beneﬁto fb r i n g -
ing together diﬀerent strands of the economic literature. Even though the study proposed
here relates most closely to Woodford (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Eisfeldt
(2004), the employed setup builds upon Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) and Geanakoplos
(2003). Three branches of the literature therefore relate to this study.
The problem of how to embed an endogenous asset structure in general equilibrium is
well known and has recently been addressed by Geanakoplos and Zame (2002). In their
work, lending is subject to the provision of collateral and they highlight what ineﬃciencies
are caused by the introduction of collateral requirements. Geanakoplos (2003) applies this
perspective to the study of liquidity: he provides an explanation of margin/liquidity changes
5which depends on the kind of information that becomes available in ﬁnancial market. While
the asset structure employed here is based upon their work, their analysis abstracts from
the role of informational asymmetries in the determination of liquidity. In the context of
the insurance model, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) address the issue of informational
asymmetry in competitive markets. Agents trade shares of diﬀerent pools and each pool is
characterized by a maximum number of shares each individual can purchase. Active pools
are endogenously selected in equilibrium, thereby recasting the Rotschild-Stiglitz model. In
doing so they propose an argument to establish the existence and robustness of separating
equilibria in a competitive context where the usual oﬀ-equilibrium reasoning cannot be
applied. In my work I tackle the same methodological diﬃculty and thus adapt their
argument to show that (illiquid) pooling equilibria are robust to optimistic perturbations
in the spirit of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).
In this paper I leave moral hazard aside and focus on the role of private information.
In this way the argument naturally evolves towards adverse selection, outlined as crucial
to ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing since the seminal contributions of Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and
Majluf (1978) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Since these studies, entrepreneur’s private
information is recognized as an important limitation in the ﬁnancing of proﬁtable investment
opportunities. Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Mayluf (1984) focus on the choice of
whether or not to issue new securities when entrepreneurs/managers undertake valuable
projects on which they are privately informed. They argue that constraining the issuance
of securities, or just refraining from issuance, signals the quality of the available investment
opportunity. This same perspective has been recently revived and enhanced by Duﬃea n d
DeMarzo (1999), DeMarzo (2003) in the context of security design. When the issuer of a
security has better information about its underlying value, the design problem becomes non
trivial. Issuers typically face two issues: the design of the security they wish to sell and the
decision regarding how much should be sold. Diﬀerent kinds of securities convey diﬀerent
information and hedge in diﬀerent ways against the potential "Lemons market" problem.
Here I follow the same intuition but I focus on the case of a production economy. Because
of the investment opportunity they face, entrepreneurs prefer "money" today to "money"
tomorrow. In order to raise funds, they take into account their private information and
issue the security that provides them the best trade-oﬀ between the price they receive, net
of the information-based liquidity cost, and the number of securities of that kind they are
able to issue.
The positive relation between the liquidity of an economy and its performance has
recently received attention. The important contribution of Eisfeldt (2004) is probably the
ﬁrst attempt in this direction. In her paper, agents are inﬁnitely lived and can ﬁnance
the investment opportunity they face selling claims over future production of the initiated
projects they own. Since there are two kinds of projects in the economy -let’s call them
good and bad- but claims are indistinguishable in capital markets, claims over good projects
are underpriced while claims over bad projects are overpriced. Since bad claims are always
completely sold and good claims are partially sold because of the cost they entail, the
share of good claims increases when the economy faces a positive productivity shock and
viceversa. The most natural criticism to this approach is that entrepreneurs may change
6the security they issue depending on the state of the economy. Our framework addresses
precisely this point.
The last branch of literature connected to this work refers to the role of government debt
in fostering private investment. Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) present
this argument in the context of imperfect capital markets (the former) and moral hazard
(the latter). Their conclusion is the illustration of when and how the supply of government
debt tackles the illiquidity of the economy beside what is already possible through private
capital markets. The intuition behind their work - which can be tracked back to Cass
and Yaari (1966) - is that government debt provides a transfer technology that becomes
particularly useful when markets are illiquid. This work recasts the same intuition but
with an additional twist: in a setting where ﬁrms may choose the security they issue, the
introduction of government debt does not only foster private investment but also aﬀects the
type of securities that are issued in equilibrium.
Outline. Section 2 lays out the setup and equilibrium deﬁnition. Sections 3 discusses
the equilibrium. Section 4 develops the relation between business cycle and the equilibrium
level of liquidity. Sections 5 and 6 extend the baseline introducing, respectively, government
debt and ﬁnancial arrangements. Section 7 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Baseline Economy: Setup with Physical Collateral
This setup formalizes the discussion above. The reader can refer to Figure 1 throughout
the presentation:





































• Time: Assume an economy lasting three periods: t =0 ,1,2, and where two con-
tingencies, s = {G(ood),B(ad)}, can realize at t =2with probability {p,1 − p}
respectively;
• Commodity Space: there is a single perishable consumption/capital good in each
period. Let ch
t (s) denote the amount consumed by agent h at time t in state s;
• Agents and Endowment: there is a continuum of agents h ∈ [0,1], uniformly
distributed. Each agent has an equal endowment proﬁle (w,w,0) ∈ <3
+ where w
7denotes individual endowment measured in units of the unique good;
• Investment Opportunities: every agent has the same ex ante probability of fac-
ing an investment opportunity and knows that he can own at most one project in
his lifetime. At t =0each agent encounters an investment opportunity (and thus
becomes an entrepreneur) with probability π0. By the law of large numbers π0 is
also the measure of t =0entrepreneurs. At t =1the probability of becoming an
entrepreneur is π1 and the measure of t =1entrepreneurs is 0 < [π1 · (1 − π0)] < 1.
Also, [π0 + π1 · (1 − π0)] < 1.E a c hh becomes aware of his technology’s productivity
λi only at the time when he faces the investment opportunity.
For reasons that will become clear later, we choose π0 and π1 such that consumers
have positive consumption in each period, after they lend to entrepreneurs. All agents
are ex ante identical, but they diﬀer ex post if they face an investment opportunity.






t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Investment Opportunity at t = 0
Investment Opportunity at t = 1
No Investment Opportunity at t = 0










• Preferences: in order to focus on liquidity only, it is convenient to assume that


























s ∈ {G,B} at t =2only
• Information Structure
At t =0each and every agent can observe the actual value of any investment project
in the economy and the expected delivery of each security is observable. Therefore,
lending involves no asymmetric information
At t =1every agent is privately informed about the actual value of the securities in
his portfolio and about the productivity of his investment project (if he is an entrepre-
neur). Given the way securities are constructed - as detailed below - entrepreneurs are
privately informed about the actual quality of the securities they are issuing. Because
8of asymmetric information, buyers can only form expectations about the average value






about investment projects/collateral and individual portfolios
This information structure may seem contrived. For the sake of our argument there is
no need to assume this exact structure. We could equivalently assume that asymmetric
information also characterizes t =0and all the results of this paper would still hold.
In fact, t =0would be an almost identical copy of t =1and we could therefore extend
to t =0the analysis and conclusion of t =1 , given some minor adaptations.
We have chosen this construction because it highlights more thoroughly the diﬀerent
eﬀects of private information. The structure we will use in the paper shows that
even the mere anticipation of t =1asymmetric information has an eﬀect on the
equilibrium prices of t =0symmetric information economy.
• Technology: there are 2 diﬀerent types of investment projects, i =( H(igh variance),L (ow variance)






if s = G
if s = B
λi ∈ {λH,λ L}
1 >λ H >λ L > 0




The function g(.) is a standard strictly concave neoclassical production function, while
It is the units of capital invested. The ranking of technologies is based on expected
production, i.e.:
Es [gi (It;s)] = [p(1 + λi)+( 1− p)(1 − λi)]g(It)=
=[ 1+( 2 p − 1)λi]g (It)







=[ 1+( 2 p − 1)λi]
dg (It)
dIt
Notice ﬁnally that we assume perfect positive correlation (i.e. aggregate uncer-
tainty) in technology’s payoﬀ14. This is equivalent to assume that there two aggregate
14This assumption is made to simplify notation and without loss of generality.
9states but that each production process is subject to technology speciﬁc state con-
tingent shock. The two technologies are distributed in the aggregate according to
measure η(.):
λi v (η(H),η(L)=1− η(H))
1 >η(H) > 0
• Security Structure15: lending is mediated through the exchange of securities that
are traded in anonymous ﬁnancial markets. Securities’ payments are guaranteed by
the provision of collateral16. Here the only available collateral is the amount of the
single good built into invested capital. (Finitely) many ﬁnancial contracts (securities)
can be generated by simply adjusting the level of collateral, as we now illustrate.
Each security is characterized by a vector Di
j of state contingent deliveries, Di
j(s),
which depends on the level of collateral j and the quality of technology i where the
collateral is employed. The collateral is physical units of capital and the number of
units of capital attached to a security is labelled by j.A l lﬁnancial contracts, issued
either at t =0or t =1with collateral j in technology i, translate into deliveries at





j(G)=m i n{1,(1 + λi)j}
Di
j(B)=m i n{1,(1 − λi)j}
¸
(1)
By construction, each ﬁnancial contract pays 1 unit of the consumption good if there
is no default and, respectively, [(1 + λi)j] or [(1 − λi)j] otherwise17. The delivery
vector (Di
j)i st h u sa ﬀected by both the level of collateral (j) and the quality of the
technology (i) in which it is employed. Notice that the collateral value is an increasing










[p(1 + λi)+( 1− p)(1 − λi)] · j if 0 ≤ j ≤ 1
1+λi
p +( 1− p)(1 − λi) · j if 1
1+λi ≤ j ≤ 1
1−λi




p =P r ( s = G); (1 − p)=P r ( s = B)
λi ∈ {λH,λ L}
1 >λ H >λ L > 0
15Similar to Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) and Geanakoplos (2002).
16The majority of lending is subject to collateral requirements, in particular a large share of credit to the
productive sector. In Italy, 20 % of credit to ﬁrms is guaranteed by the provision of real collateral only.
Notice this is likely to be a large understatement of the importance of collateral. This is due to the diﬃculty
of measuring other kind of collateral relevant to lending decision (e.g. ﬁnancial collateral or “implicit”
collateral).


















1/(1+ λ i) 1/(1- λ i)
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Figure 3
Each security/ﬁnancial contract is characterized by a delivery vector, the fundamental
determinant of its price18. By assumption, the seller of a security always knows the
quality of the technology where the collateral is invested. A fortiori he is always
aware about the actual delivery of the security he is selling.
Given the assumed information structure, securities issued at t =0are identiﬁed by
the pair (j,i). Thus the market for each security is indexed by (j,i) and this notation
denotes the fact that t =0securities with collateral level j are traded on two separate
i-speciﬁc market.
Securities issued at t =1i n s t e a da r ei n d e x e db yt h el e v e lo fc o l l a t e r a l( j)o n l ys i n c e
buyers do not know the technology where the collateral is invested. Each security
market is denoted by (j) only.
This setup provides a simple microfoundation of a security’s value. I assume that this
depends upon the units of collateral (i.e. units of capital invested) attached to it and
the quality of the technology where these units are invested. The assumptions that
the value of collateral is a increasing function of production and that it is directly
related to the technology speciﬁc parameter λi play a central role in our arguments.
A number of stories could provide an economic rationale for it. In fact this is no
diﬀerent than assuming that the more productive a ﬁrm is, the more valuable its
"plants" (units of capital) are, and that the better is the economic performance of a
ﬁrm - its production here - the more valuable its capital becomes.
• Security Holdings: agent h may hold ah
t (j,i) units of the ﬁnancial contract (j)w i t h
the standard convention that ah
t (j,i) < 0 when he sells and ah
t (j,i) > 0 when he buys.
It will be apparent below that, because of collateral requirements, it is convenient to
18Notice that the concavity of the production function together with the linearity of the collateralization
rule imply that future production is not completely seizable by lenders at t =2 . In particular, standing our
assumptions, the share of production that can be seized is an increasing function of the investment size, I,
given the concavity of g(.) and is constant across contingency, given I.
11adopt the following notation:
θh


























refers to the securities issued at t =0that are purchased at t =1 .
• Security Pricing: Iw i l ld e n o t eb yq0(j,i) the price of a security issued at t =0with
collateral j invested in technology i,b yq1(j) the price of a security issued at t =1
with collateral j and by qR
1 (j) the price of a security issued at t =0and traded at
t =1the resale market. Thus prices are denoted by the vectors:
q0; q1; qR
1 ∈ <N·10100
• Individual Budget Constraint19
Since the issue of securities requires the provision of collateral and collateral coincides
with capital, only entrepreneurs can issue new securities. So the issue of securities has
to satisfy:
Collateral Constraint (Physical Collateral) P
ϕh
t (j,i) ϕh
t (j,i)j ≤ Ih
t
(CC(t))
Intuitively, the total collateral employed by one borrower can not exceed the units
of capital he builds. Since investment, and therefore capital, is endogenous, the bor-
rowing constraints are endogenous too20.A g e n th’s t =1long positions can only be
resold at t =0and so each agent satisﬁes:
Resaleability Constraint:
0 ≤ γh




ji is the share of security i purchased at t =0and resold at t =1by h.
Intuitively, no one can resell at t =1more securities than he bought at t =0 .
In this case, agent h faces the following budget constraint Bh (q).A tt =0 ,i fh is a
consumer:
ch







19The reader may refer to the Figure 2 for a better grasp of the budget constraint.
20Geanakoplos (2002) deﬁnes the liquidity of an economy “by how closely the collateral budget set comes
to attaining the general equilibrium (with incomplete markets) budget set”. The intuition is similar to what
we have here though his does not explicitly relate to asymmetric information as the conceptual basis of
liquidity.
12while if h is an entrepreneur:
ch
0 + Ih











At t =1 ,i fh is a consumer:
ch























If h is an entrepreneur, we have:
ch
1 + Ih



































































































where i∗is the average collateral quality of the securities purchased at t =1 . t =2
securities’ payoﬀ depends on the actual value of collateral. Since consumers are all
identical, they hold the same portfolio so the actual value of collateral is nothing else
than the average one, given any j.
The budget constraint is notationally intense but standard in the interpretation. Con-
sumers allocate their endowment between consumption and the purchase of securities,
while entrepreneurs issue securities, trade their portfolio and allocate their endowment
between consumption and investment.
• Notation: I adopt the following convention in labelling a generic variable x:
xh
t,k(s)
where k ∈ {π0,(1 − π0),π1,(1 − π1)}. This convention allows to distinguish between
individuals, at a given time t, that face an investment opportunity {π0,π1} and indi-
viduals who do not {(1 − π0),(1 − π1)}. For instance, ϕh
1,π1(j) denotes the number of
units of security j sold by an entrepreneur at t =1 .
13In order to keep notation intuitive, I will often use the superscript (i) instead of (h)
to denote that a variable relates to the entrepreneurs owning technology i. Ii
t thus
denotes individual investment undertaken at time t by an entrepreneur endowed with
technology i. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, I will often use the superscript i (i)
to denote best (worst) technologies/securities.
2.1 Deﬁnition of the Equilibrium




























































































dh =0 ,t =2 ,s ∈ {G,B}
(Goods Market)
3 Equilibrium in the Baseline Economy
Iw i l lﬁrst illustrate the symmetric information benchmark and then I will discuss at length
the properties of the production economy where private information is present. Before doing
so, it is necessary to analyze in detail the relationship among the payoﬀs of securities of
diﬀerent types. This will identify the security space in which our analysis is made. We turn
to this question now.
3.1 Security Payoﬀs: Collateral and the Delivery Vector
In equilibrium, each security is priced according to the expected consumption it delivers.
This expectation is clearly aﬀected by the presence of asymmetric information. In this
subsection I show the implications of choosing the level of collateral for the relation between
the payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent securities. This is the prerequisite to characterizing, in terms of
14collateral level, the security a ﬁrm will optimally issue. For the entire discussion in Section
3Ia s s u m e :
(A.1) The probability that the Good state realizes is p<1/2.
(A.1) implies that technology L is ranked superior, in expected production, to technology
H (since λH >λ L). As a consequence of the ranking across technologies, the expected














p < ½ --- λ H > λ L
Figure 4
(A.1) will be relaxed later when the case p>1/2 will be addressed in section 4 where I
apply our framework to the analysis of the business cycle.
Without loss of generality, recalling (2), we can restrict our attention to the following
security space:















j ]is equalized for securities 0 <j≤ 1
1+λH, we can restrict attention to
j = 1
1+λH.
3.2 The Economy with Symmetric Information
In this section I discuss the symmetric information benchmark of the economy with entre-
preneurial private information. Collateral is still required to issue securities and borrow.
Since the value of collateral is “transparent” (i.e. anyone can check its worth at any time)
lenders always know the actual delivery of the security they are purchasing. Since prefer-












; t =1 , ∀i
15Notice that the security price may be strictly larger than its expected delivery at t =0 ,s i n c e
t =0securities serve as a source of ﬁnancing at t =1and thus relax the collateral constraint
even further. This service is beneﬁcial to t =1entrepreneurs, when the collateral constraint
binds, and thus is positively priced at t =0 . In order for the problem to be meaningful we
















be the gross rate of return (or interest factor) for collateral of quality i in security j. Ri
t(j) is





, and the market price, q1(j), of security
j issued by entrepreneur with technology i.

























t is the multiplier on the collateral constraint CC(t) and measures the beneﬁto f
relaxing it. The interpretation is straight forward: the level of investment, Ii
1, is determined









and the beneﬁt of relaxing the collateralization constraint, βi
1, - is equal to the marginal
cost - the rate of return of the issued security, Ri
t(j), and the cost in terms of collateral




It is immediate to observe that technology i holder issues the security that minimizes the
collateral relative to price (
j
qt(j,i)), i.e. security j(i)=1 /(1 + λi). For simplicity I assume
that w is large enough so that lenders maintain positive consumption (net of lending) at
t =0(and thus at t =1 )22.
Entrepreneurs, by their individual budget constraint, can invest up to the point where
the collateralization constraint is binding:
Ii


















, i.e. the sum of the entrepreneur’s














22Alternatively: entrepreneurs are a suﬃciently small share of the total population.
16Thus we have, since qt(j,i) >q t(j,i),t h a tIi
t >I
i





























¢∗ denotes the equilibrium level of investment for the economy with symmetric






ji is the security issued by entrepreneur i
otherwise no agent would purchase the security that pays the smaller rate of return. Since
diﬀerent technologies pay the same rate of return, diﬀerent quality entrepreneurs borrow at
the same terms and no adverse selection takes place. The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 1 In the economy without private information, the followings hold:
1. a technology i entrepreneur issues that security which minimizes the ratio of collateral
to market price (
j
qt(j,i)), i.e. security ji =1 /(1 + λi);




























t(ji)∀t, i.e. the rate of return is equalized across
technologies;
4. the equilibrium is constrained pareto optimal23.
3.3 The Economy with Asymmetric Information
3.3.1 Market Equilibrium at t =1
We determine the equilibrium of our economy proceeding by backward induction. At t =2 ,
the ﬁnal period, ﬁnancial contracts are settled and production realizes. Each entrepreneur
either defaults or he does not. In the event of default, he surrenders the collateral underlying
his short positions. If he does not default, he pays his promises. Agents holding long
positions thus receive either payments or the value of consumption corresponding to the
collateral they are entitled to24. Finally everyone consumes his net wealth: no other choices
are made.
At t =1measure [π1 (1 − π0)] of agents face an investment opportunity and become
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can raise funds in two ways through anonymous ﬁnancial
23Constrained here refers to the collateralization constraint imposed on borrowers.
24See page 10.
17markets: either selling some of the securities they previously acquired or issuing new se-
curities using the capital they are building as collateral. In both cases private information
plays a crucial role:
(A.2) (Collateral Unobservability) At t =1the purchaser of a security cannot
observe the actual value of the collateral underlying it.
(A.3) (Private Information) At t =1the issuer/reseller of a security is privately
informed about its actual value.
At t =1 , the buyer of a security can only observe the number of units of collateral
attached to the security he is purchasing. At any given level of collateral, he can only form
expectations about the value of collateral for the average traded security. This expectation
is the crucial determinant of t =1market prices,. q1(j) and qR
1 (j).
Agents selling their long positions, in the resale market, bear the burden of private
information. This results from the assumption that a security’s quality is unobservable,
given the level of collateral. Since sellers of "bad" securities wish to be viewed as sellers of
"good" ones, a single market price emerges for any given collateral level. This price in turn
reﬂects, by rational expectations, the expected value of the average security resold in that
market.
A similar problem is faced by issuers of new securities at t =1 . They take into account
the role of private information when they decide how much collateral is attached to the
securities they are issuing. As pointed out before, the central question becomes how much
s e p a r a t i o na c r o s st e c h n o l o g i e s ,i fa n y ,w i l lb e present in equilibrium, i.e. whether the equi-
librium in the security space is going to be pooling or separating. Therefore, in order to
address the issue of liquidity, one has to establish the kind of equilibrium that will prevail:
I turn to this now.
3.3.2 Equilibrium Securities at t =1 : the economic intuition
In equilibrium, each ﬁnancial contract is priced according to the expected consumption it
delivers. Because of asymmetric information, buyers do not know the actual delivery of
the security they are buying and so they must form expectations about it. In principle the
relation between market price and expected delivery may change across diﬀerent securities,
providing diﬀerent incentives for the sellers of less valuable securities (i) to mimic sellers of
more valuable ones. In general, the less costly it is to reproduce the behavior of the good
technology entrepreneurs, the more depressed is the market price, q1(j), and the higher the
illiquidity for securities with good collateral, (i).
Optimally, holders of good technologies would need to put up less collateral (since their
collateral is more valuable) in order to guarantee some given delivery vector. But the
holders of bad technologies, i.e. providers of low quality collateral, may try to mimic them
in order to deceive the market and sell overpriced securities. At the same time the owners
of good technologies, anticipating this “shading”, tend to increase the amount of collateral
in the security they issue. However this increase bears a trade-oﬀ: on the one hand, higher
collateral per security unambiguously increases the delivery and then the market price; on
the other hand, it reduces the number of security units (and thus leverage) an entrepreneur
may sell.
18The buyer of a ﬁnancial asset thus faces a “Lemons market” problem: he knows that,
given the market price, all agents with securities whose actual value is below the market
price will sell and realize a capital gain. This drives down the equilibrium market price of
traded ﬁnancial contracts. The lower market price implicitly imposes a premium charged
upon those entrepreneurs with good technologies issuing securities backed by good collateral.
Notice that the “Lemons” problem arises because the holders and issuers of bad securities
always sell to the market relatively more shares than the holders of good ones.
Notice also the importance of (A.2): since the productivity of investment opportunities
at t =1is private information, each entrepreneur would rather issue new collateralized
securities than sell good securities in his portfolio. Finally, in a pooling equilibrium, holders
of good securities ﬁnd it optimal to undersell their securities and pay the liquidity premium
in order to fund their (more proﬁtable) investment opportunities. Since all agents are risk
neutral furthermore, the (liquidity) premium is due only to asymmetric information and
not to risk.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Securities at t =1 : a formal analysis
Equilibrium and Oﬀ-Equilibrium Pricing The ﬁrst step necessary to characterize
the equilibrium of our economy consists in the deﬁnition of pricing. Within the proposed
competitive analysis in the presence of private information, this raises some important






in the appendix - the




















Since buyers can only observe the amount of collateral attached to the security they are
purchasing, the price is indexed by j only. The equations above formalize the assumption of
rational expectations: the equilibrium price must be equal to the expected delivery (quality)
of the average security25 traded at collateral level j. The average security in turn depends
on the relative shares of good investment across technologies.
In order to choose the optimal security, entrepreneurs must be able to compare the price
for the possible securities they may issue. Although establishing prices for equilibrium secu-
rities is conceptually simple, rational expectations provide no guidance in the determination
of prices for non traded securities. This may lead to a paradox: every agent may expect
the price of all oﬀ-equilibrium securities to be zero, simply because no one is trading them.
In order to get around this problem, I refer to the recent work by Dubey and Geanakop-
los (2003) in the context of the insurance model. They address this feature by imposing
a tremble “on the market”: introducing an external agent forced to trade securities that
would otherwise be absent, they are able to precisely deﬁne oﬀ equilibrium prices.























, everyone would buy security j and an excess demand would appear.
19Here I adapt Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003)’s reasoning in a closely related argument.
I establish an external agent of measure ε = {εj}j   J to issue every oﬀ-equilibrium security
as if he were a good quality entrepreneur. The price of oﬀ-equilibrium security j0 would





, if only the external agent were to issue it. Therefore the external
agent pins down prices diﬀerent from zero in all markets. I denote the economy where the
external agent has been introduced as an "ε-economy".
In order to determine the equilibrium of the ε-economy, one has to check whether en-
trepreneurs ﬁnd it proﬁtable to issue the same original security or to deviate to another. In
practice we are asking each agent whether an entrepreneur would "change his mind", once
the external agent is introduced. Taking into account the optimizing behavior of all agents,
one can, by rational expectations, compute the security prices for the given ε-economy -
i.e. the equilibrium prices of the economy where the external agent is forced to issue some





























Thus, rearranging section 2.1, the equilibrium of the ε-economy is deﬁned:




























































































dh =0 ,t =2 ,s ∈ {G,B}
(Goods Market)
Finally, one takes the measure of external agent to zero, i.e. ε(n) → 0 for n −→ +∞.
If, as the external agent gets smaller and smaller, more and more entrepreneurs leave oﬀ-
equilibrium securities and return back to issue the original security/ies, we say that the
20original security/ies is/are an equilibrium surviving the “tremble”. In principle, the larger
is the set of expected deliveries of external agent for which an equilibrium survives, the
more robust we will say it is. For the sake of simplicity, we have explicitly considered only
the case most likely to break any equilibrium, where the external agent behaves as a good
quality entrepreneur. If an equilibrium surviv e st h i s" o p t i m i s t i c "t r e m b l e ,i ts u r v i v e sa n y
other tremble where the external agent behaves as an entrepreneur of lower quality. Thus
we will say that an equilibrium is robust if it survives the tremble in which the external
agent behaves as a good quality entrepreneur. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium is robust if it is the limit, for εj(n) → 0 when n −→ +∞,o f





in each oﬀ-equilibrium security.
Reinterpreting the notion of pool in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) as our notion of
security, we can appeal to their Theorem 1 and be ensured that a robust equilibrium always
exists. In the following section I turn to the conditions under which pooling equilibria are
robust.
Liquidity Premium and Optimal Security In the discussion I will keep on referring to
the FOCs of the individual problem and refer to the appendix for details. In an equilibrium
where entrepreneurs endowed with diﬀerent technologies issue diﬀerent securities ji,i . e .i na
separating equilibrium, the ratio Ri
1(ji)=1 , ∀i. Instead, if, in equilibrium, all entrepreneurs
issue the same security jpool, i.e. if the equilibrium is pooling, it must be that:
Ri
1(jpool) > 1 >R
i
1(jpool)
Since our focus is economy wide liquidity, we will use the following measure of liquidity at
each time t:





i.e. as the diﬀerence between the rates of return of the security issued by entrepreneurs with
better technology, ji and of the security issued by entrepreneurs with worse technology, ji.
Therefore, in a pooling equilibrium LPt > 0 and the economy is said imperfectly liquid
(or illiquid), while in a separating equilibrium LPt =0and the economy is in fact liquid.
Because of rational expectations, (7) ensures that security prices reﬂect the average
quality. The better a technology is the higher (weakly) is the interest rate it pays. Therefore,
in equilibrium, marginal productivity is smaller and investment higher, the worse is the
technology. This is the intuition behind the instance of adverse selection that will appear
here. Equation (5) states the reference criterion by which the entrepreneur chooses the
21optimal security to issue. Since this is also relevant in the case of asymmetric information,






















1 is the multiplier on the collateral constraint CC(1). The reader is referred to (5)
for the relevant interpretation. Here it suﬃces to note that (5) deﬁnes equality between
marginal beneﬁta n dm a r g i n a lc o s t .
In order for our problem to be interesting, the collateral must be binding. Let us notice
that:
Remark 1 If the function g(.) is suﬃciently unproductive (or endowment w is suﬃciently
large), entrepreneurs do not use all the capital they build as collateral. Given this technology,
the collateral constraint is slack, i.e. βi
1 =0 , ∀i, and the equilibrium security is j = j.I n




¢∗ is small enough and the equilibrium security
entails no default: the informational asymmetry is immaterial and no adverse selection
takes place.
Therefore we say that liquidity problems are a feature of suﬃciently productive economies.
The interesting phenomena arise for the class of economies in which, because of asymmetric







1 > 0 (8)
Therefore, since the existence of a pooling equilibrium is the foundation of our analysis
of liquidity, it is necessary to characterize its suﬃcient conditions. As stated above, pooling
equilibria in the security space b J are deﬁned by the fact that a single security jpool is optimal
for any entrepreneur, i.e. ∀i. The entrepreneurs with the worst technology are better oﬀ
in the pooling equilibrium since they pay a low interest rate and issue securities with low
collateral. The entrepreneurs with the best technology face instead a trade-oﬀ:o n o n e
hand, they pay a higher interest rate than they would in a separating equilibrium; on the
other, they issue securities carrying less collateral than the ones in a separating equilibrium.
Therefore, the only agents with an incentive to abandon the pooling equilibrium are the
good quality entrepreneurs wishing to diﬀerentiate themselves. They can do so increasing
the level of collateral of the security they are issuing. But this is costly since, increasing the
collateral per unit, an entrepreneur decreases the number of securities he can issue by (8).






but reduces the number of security units (and thus leverage) an entrepreneur
may issue.

















1 (j − q1(j)) (9)
22where (j − q1(j)) > 0 under (A.1)26. Thus security j is issued by entrepreneur i,i . e .








In the appendix I prove that the minimization of the equation above leads to the Theorem
below about the existence of robust pooling equilibria. Since in the discussion that follows
I maintain (A.1), technology L (low variance) is ranked superior to technology H (high
variance)27.
Theorem 1 (Unique Pooling Equilibrium) Under the maintained setup and assump-
tions (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), economies characterized by a suﬃciently large share, η(L),
of better technology entrepreneurs, i.e. 1 ≥ η(L) ≥ (η(L))
∗, display a unique robust pooling
equilibrium j = jpool in the security space. These economies are illiquid since they display
a positive liquidity premium at t =1 :
LP1 > 0
Proof. Appendix.
Theorem 2 has the following corollary:
Corollary 1 In the pooling equilibrium jpool = j each technology holder i issues security j
only.
Theorem 2 has a somewhat complicated statement but a simple interpretation. It states
that a pooling equilibrium in which only the security with the lowest collateral in b J, j,i s
issued by every entrepreneur emerges if the population of entrepreneurs is characterized by
as u ﬃciently high share of good quality technologies. The intuition is simple: good quality
entrepreneurs choose the pooling security weighing two factors. On one hand, they bear
the diﬀerence between the market price and the actual value of the security they are selling
-t h e" p r i c ee ﬀect"; on the other hand, they beneﬁt from the additional leverage allowed
by the fact that the pooling security requires less collateral, per unit, than any alternative
security they may decide to issue- the "quantity eﬀect" or "leverage eﬀect". The theorem
above is only saying that the cost of “sticking” to the pooling equilibrium security for
good quality entrepreneurs increases with the share of bad quality entrepreneurs in the
population, while the cost of increasing the level of collateral per security stays the same.
It is therefore natural to argue that, as we increase the share of entrepreneurs endowed with
the bad quality technology, the increase in the costly "price eﬀect" may eventually oﬀset
the beneﬁcial "quantity eﬀect" - the additional leverage - that the pooling security j entails.
The condition on the relative share between good and bad quality entrepreneurs, though
only suﬃcient, delivers a pooling equilibrium robust to perturbations in which any mix of
good and bad entrepreneurs is forced to issue oﬀ equilibrium securities. This result, at
26S e eF i g u r e4 .
27λ2 <λ 1 by assumption.
23odds with the implications of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003)28, is of interest in its own
right. The intuition behind the robustness of pooling equilibria in our framework comes
from a local failure of the "single crossing property" necessary to separation in signalling
models. Here good quality entrepreneurs may attempt to distinguish themselves by issuing
securities with higher collateral level. The problem is that, since their collateral is more
valuable, their expected delivery increases relatively faster than that of bad quality securities
as the collateral level increases. Therefore, the positive correlation between collateral value
and technology’s quality is ultimately responsible for the local failure of the "single crossing
property". This failure is suﬃcient to restrain good entrepreneurs from abandoning the
pooling equilibrium, even in the presence of "optimistic" beliefs about the average quality
of the other securities, hence the robustness result.
The robustness of our pooling equilibrium has important macroeconomic implications.
It shows that not only liquidity shortages may arise in the economy, but it states that imper-
fect liquidity, generated by asymmetric information, is robust to the diﬀerent expectations
that entrepreneurs may form about the prices of oﬀ-equilibrium securities. The only con-
dition required for this result to hold, beside the fact that there are “enough” good quality
entrepreneurs, is that better entrepreneurs employ more valuable collateral in guaranteeing
their security.
Equilibria with Partial Resale: An Instructive Case It is instructive to study the
equilibrium that arises in this economy when a pooling equilibrium emerges at j = j0 in
t =0security space and entrepreneurs resell only a part of the high quality securities, i,
they own. g(.) and η(i) can be chosen so that these two features are equilibrium outcome.
Theorem 2 above focuses on the conditions suﬃcient for t =1entrepreneurs to issue
the same security jpool. In general the level of investment Ii
1 i se q u a lt ot h es u mo ft h r e e
distinct sources:
Ii






















Since entrepreneurs borrow as much as they can since, we can exploit Theorem 2 and
the Corollary 3 to ﬁnd that the maximum level of investment with asymmetric information.































j ). (11) says that the optimal
28Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) argue that, organizing security trade through "pools", separating equi-
libria always exist and are the only one robust to "optimistic" oﬀ-equilibrium expectations.
29Subsection 1 of the appendix.
24level of investment is an increasing function of endowment and resources raised in the resale
















but I have not derived how entrepreneurs choose which shares, γh
j0,i,π1, they are reselling. I
turn to this now. Observing:
Proposition 2 Suppose that at t =0the equilibrium in the security market is pooling at























where security i has better quality than i.
The economic interpretation is that the market price in the resale market is (weakly)
above the expected delivery of the worse security. Thus every entrepreneurs completely
resells the worse security i,i . e . γh
j0,i,π1 =1 . Proposition 4 above implies that consumers
never resell good quality securities purchased at t =0 . Otherwise they would incur a capital
loss. Diﬀerent is the case for t =1entrepreneurs. By (11), investment is diﬀerent from






.T h eﬁrst reason
for the diﬀerence was outlined above and is due to asymmetric information in the market
for newly issued securities: the market price is below (above) the expected delivery of i (i).
The second reason is asymmetric information in the resale market: investors resell only part
of their good securities since they pay a liquidity cost whenever they do so.
Under the technological assumption of this case, entrepreneurs are borrowing con-

















In this case, investors resell high quality security up to the point where the equation is
satisﬁed, in other words:
γh
j0i,π1 < 1 (12)
Thus, by rearranging the FOCs with respect to the number of security j issued by an
entrepreneur with technology i, ϕh
1(j,i), his investment level, Ii
1, and the share of good
securities he resold, γh






















30This condition is determined rearranging the FOCs with respect to I
i
1 and γij bearing in mind that
entrepreneurs with the best technology do not resell the entirity of high quality secuirities they own in this
equilibrium.
25The interpretation of this condition is simple. First, observe that Ri
1(j) is the rate of
return or, better, the rate of repayment of security j. It is the ratio between what an
agent is paying in the future, the expected delivery, and what he gets today through the
market price. Given optimal securities, (13) says that the diﬀerence in the cost of rais-




























Notice that the investment level is diﬀerent from the symmetric information benchmark
because of (12). The resale market is only a residual way to ﬁnance investment, since it is
used below its full information potential. Therefore, when the equilibrium in the security









> 0, i.e. the resale market has a higher degree of
adverse selection than the market for newly issued securities. Therefore entrepreneurs with
better technologies, i, will use the resale market as a source of funding only once the issuance
of new securities is limited by the collateral available.































The remark above allows us to deﬁne:










The deﬁnition above simply points out that the early liquidation of a security comes
at a cost that exceeds the one associated with newly issued securities. This is equivalent
to say that the average quality in the resale market is lower. This result reﬂects optimal
decision making: entrepreneurs accept to pay higher liquidity premia in the resale market
because reselling securities not only provides extra funds for investment but, relaxing the
collateralization constraint, allows the issuance of even more new securities. The reader is
reminded that the resale market trades securities that had been issued at t =0but deliver
at t =2 .






















Therefore the rates of return for good and bad quality entrepreneurs/securities are in the
following relation:
Ri
1(j) > 1 >R
i
1(j); ∀j<j




high quality entrepreneurs issue securities with more collateral and are subject to a negative
leverage eﬀect. These observations imply that better technologies entrepreneurs always
borrow under worse terms with asymmetric information.
The diﬀerence between the terms of borrowing for high and low quality entrepreneurs,
absent in the symmetric information benchmark, is responsible for the instance of the
adverse selection in investment we have here31.
3.4 Market Equilibrium at t =0
This section studies t =0equilibrium of this economy and so concludes the discussion of
the baseline economy. t =0consumers lend to entrepreneurs and consumes the rest of their
endowment w. The fraction of entrepreneurs in the total population at t =0is π0,w h i c h
coincides with the ex ante probability of becoming an entrepreneur at t =0 . Access to the
credit market is still beneﬁcial to entrepreneurs because of (4).
The discussion in section 3.1 assumed that diﬀerent entrepreneurs chose the same secu-
rity at t =0 . This implied that the securities traded in the resale market are illiquid. It is
now necessary to prove that this assumption is indeed an equilibrium result. In order to do
so I will brieﬂy recast the reasoning presented above in the context of t =0security choice.
I will then appeal to Theorem 2 and say that, under analogous conditions, we have a t =0
robust pooling equilibrium in the security space.
Equilibrium Asset Pricing Each ﬁnancial contract is priced at t =0according to
the expected consumption it delivers and the liquidity premium it implies. Equilibrium
pricing of a t =0security can be determined by the FOC with respect to θh
0,1−π0(j,i) in
the individual problem. Assuming that entrepreneurs are a suﬃciently small portion of the

















1(k) is the multiplier of the budget constraint at t =1in contingency k.E a c h
individual faces two contingencies at t =1 : k = π1 when the agent faces a project and
31The reader should observe that adverse selection in investment is not an exclusive feature of pooling equi-
libria. In fact, even in the presence of a separating equilibrium, entrepreneurs with high quality technology
would borrow under worse terms by issuing securities with strictly more collateral.
27k =1−π1 when he does not. Notice that μ1(1−π1)=1and μ1(π1) > 1.T h i si si n t u i t i v e :
the multiplier μ1(k) measures the advantage of relaxing the budget constraint in contingency
k at t =1 . Thus, if an individual has an investment opportunity, i.e. k = π1, then the
advantage of increasing his endowment is strictly bigger than marginal utility (=1 ); if agent
h does not face an investment opportunity, i.e. k =1−π1, then the beneﬁto fr e l a x i n gt h e
constraint is just his marginal utility.
In this framework, securities issued at t =0not only entitle the owner to t =2payment
but provide him with a "precautionary saving" instrument for transferring wealth to t =1 ,
the time when he could be borrowing constrained because of an investment opportunity.
Therefore t =0issuers of securities beneﬁtf r o mt h etwofold service of their securities
because prices are raised above expected delivery.
As was the case for t =1 ,d i ﬀerent liquidity levels correspond to pooling and separating
equilibria in the security space at t =0 . When the equilibrium is separating, then high
quality securities are characterized by higher collateral level and are perfectly liquid in the
resale market (i.e. they are traded at t =1for a price equal to their expected delivery).
Thus, in a separating equilibrium high quality a n dl o wq u a l i t ys e c u r i t i e sb o t hh a v et h es a m e
rate of return and the economy is perfectly liquid. By (14) the price for security (j,i) issued
at t =0 ,r e ﬂecting this liquidity, is strictly above its expected delivery:
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When the equilibrium is pooling, I have already pointed out that every entrepreneur
sells in t =1resale market all the securities i, the ones backed by low value collateral.
This is natural since low quality securities are traded at a price weakly larger than their
expected delivery when t =1entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained. Observe that low
quality securities are the cheapest way to ﬁnance private investment at t =1 , weakly better
than private endowment.
I nt h ec a s eo fs e c u r i t i e si, i.e. high quality ones, the matter is more subtle. If, because of
their endowment and technology’s productivity, entrepreneurs sell part of securities i even
in the case of a pooling equilibria (condition (12) above), then the price in the resale market
qR






. This increase has two eﬀects: (1) securities i become
more liquid since the resale price gets closer to the expected delivery but (2) all security i
are sold to realize a capital gain. But when all securities i are resold, the resale market is
"ﬂooded" by low quality securities and a Lemons market arises. In a pooling equilibrium



















q0(j,i)=q0(j,i) > 1 if j = j
(15)
There is one main comment about (15): the asymmetric information that buyers face in
case of early liquidation of their securities (at t =1 )b e n e ﬁts entrepreneurs with the worse




ji in the Appendix.
28technology i and imposes a cost on entrepreneurs with the better technology i. Since this
cost is present no matter what kind of equilibrium prevails at t =0 , adverse selection
appears in t =0investment. The reader should notice that, although the price of securities
i is equal to the expected delivery, a cost is borne by better technology owners. In fact
issuers of securities i do not beneﬁt from the fact that they provide an instrument for
“precautionary saving” to potential entrepreneurs. Because of the asymmetric information
in the resale market, only issuers of securities i gather this beneﬁt being paid a market price







I conclude the discussion of this subsection observing that a pooling equilibrium for
t =0securities emerges under similar conditions about the average entrepreneurial quality
of Theorem 2. That argument could simply be recast here and I avoid rephrasing that same
reasoning in the present context. Given the assumption about suﬃciently high average
quality in the entrepreneurial population, pooling equilibria are robust. Nonetheless notice
that supporting a pooling equilibrium in the security space at t =0can be done for a larger
parameter space than at t =1 . In fact, looking at the problem for entrepreneurs with
better technology i, one can observe that the cost of providing collateral - here the cost of
diﬀerentiation - is the same as before but the beneﬁt - the fall in the rate of repayment Ri
0(j)-
is smaller since prices already equalize expected delivery for high quality entrepreneurs, by
(15).
Notice ﬁnally, that adverse selection in t =0investment is still present here by the same
reasoning of t =1 .
This concludes the discussion of the baseline economy. I have studied the conditions
under which pooling equilibria exist. These equilibria are the foundation for the analysis
of liquidity I propose. I have shown that liquidity is an important factor in the allocation
of credit across diﬀerent technologies and, in particular, even though illiquidity may be
an equilibrium phenomenon it nevertheless decreases the eﬃciency of private investment
adversely selecting technologies. I will now develop this analysis extending it to take into
account the role of ﬁnancial markets and government debt. But before doing so I will apply
the proposed framework to the relation between the equilibrium level of liquidity and the
business cycle.
4 Business Cycle and Liquidity
There is a developing line of research in the macroeconomic literature aimed at explaining
the relation between the business cycle and liquidity of the economy33. The empirical
literature seems to point out that market liquidity tends to positively covary with the state
of the economy. In an important theoretical contribution in this line of research, Eisfeldt
(2004) takes the same conceptual perspective we adopted here regarding the interpretation
of liquidity. A summary of her results is as follows: as the productivity of technology
changes along the business cycle, entrepreneurs have the incentive to raise more funds when
productivity is higher. The only way open to entrepreneurs to ﬁnance their investment is
33Eisfeldt (2004), Rampini (2003) and Rampini and Eisfeldt (2003).
29selling claims over the future production of projects previously initiated. Since the incentive
to invest is stronger for entrepreneurs endowed with better technologies, when the economy
faces a high productivity shock, they tend to sell more claims than the owner of worse
technologies. Therefore the quality of the average traded security increases, the market
price increases and liquidity turns higher when the economy faces a higher productivity
shock. This is consistent with previous empirical work showing the positive correlation
between the liquidity of an economy and its performance.
This explanation, however, relies on a crucial restriction in the security market, a re-
striction that is not present in the model considered here: entrepreneurs can only issue
equity-like claims over future production. They cannot issue any other kind of security.
This restriction is central to the argument and may, in principles, undermine the explana-
tion of procyclical liquidity proposed in Eisfeldt (2004). In fact, if diﬀerent entrepreneurs
were to issue diﬀerent kinds of securities, these would always be liquid and there would be
no change in equilibrium liquidity as a consequence of productivity shocks. In reality, ﬁrms
have diﬀerent instruments resulting in a variety of securities they may issue. For instance,
securities may diﬀer by the likelihood of default and its extent, thereby enlarging the se-
curity space even further. This is precisely the standpoint we adopted in this work. I am
going to show how we can apply it to the study of the relation between liquidity and the
business cycle.
At least since Kydland and Prescott (1984), strong persistence in the growth rate of
aggregate output is recognized as a characteristic feature of the US economy. I translate
this simple fact by adjusting the probability attached to the G(ood) contingency, when
technologies deliver high production. In the earlier discussion I assumed (A.1.) (p<1/2),
i.e. technology L was ranked superior to technology H. I now change this assumption and
consider the alternative case p>1/2.I d e ﬁne this case as an expanding economy since,
with p>1/2, the “high production” contingency becomes relatively more likely. Notice that
this parameter change ranks technology H superior to L in terms of expected production.
This assumption changes the behavior of expected delivery as a function of the collateral
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30If expected deliveries are as in the relation described by the graph above, it is immediate
t oo b s e r v et h a tt h e r ei sas e c u r i t y ,l a b e li tjD << j = 1
1−λH, at which both expected
deliveries coincide. In fact, security jD entails no asymmetric information. This is an
interesting feature of the model because jD is perfectly liquid since the expected delivery
is unambiguous, irrespective of the technology owned by the issuer. Therefore the price is
equal to the expected delivery. It is therefore immediate to state the following proposition,
given without proof:
Proposition 4 (Boom and Separating Equilibrium) If the economy is “booming”, i.e.
p>1/2, then it is “liquid”, in the sense that the equilibrium in the security market is sepa-
rating and LPt =0 . Entrepreneurs with technology H issue security jD while entrepreneurs
with technology L issue security j.
Therefore, in the context of this paper, the increase in liquidity during a booming
economy is due to the change in the equilibrium security more than to the increase in
the average quality of the traded ones as in Eisfeldt (2004). This hypothesis seems also
appealing for its testability.
By similar reasoning, I reinterpret a stagnating economy as the one in which our original
assumption holds, i.e., p<1/234. In this case, the expected deliveries of the two technologies
can be graphed as in Figure 4 above, where the analysis discussed throughout Section 3
holds. I already pointed out that, in this case, the collateralization cost borne by the
better technology to avoid subsidizing worse securities is higher. Therefore, respecting the
conditions of Theorem 2, entrepreneurs decide to issue securities whose liquidity is less than
perfect (i.e. the equilibrium is pooling).
Therefore in order to replicate the procyclical behavior of liquidity - when securities are
endogenous - that the empirical literature highlights , it suﬃces to observe that there is a
(possibly large) class of economies for which the equilibrium in the security space delivers
liquid securities, i.e. a separating equilibrium, during booms and the illiquid j security
during recessions. This explanation does not rely upon a restriction in the security space
that the recent literature has adopted, but is nonetheless consistent with the available
evidence of procyclical liquidity. The basic mechanism here consists in the fact that ﬁrms
adapt the choice of the security they issue to the state of the economy. This choice of
entrepreneurs - I argue - is ultimately responsible for the level of liquidity of the economy.
5 Government Debt as Credit Provider
The work of Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) recognizes the beneﬁcial role
of government debt in economies with imperfect liquidity. The importance of government
bonds reached special attention in the recent policy debates when the US public debt seemed
headed toward full repayment35. This attention resulted from the underlying conviction that
government debt provides ﬁnancial markets with some important services, often identiﬁed
34Figure 4 as reference.
35Reinhart and Sack (2000).
31under the term liquidity. Here I propose an interpretation of this service that is richer
than what is already advocated in the literature in at least one respect: the introduction
of government debt may not only improve welfare but it also aﬀects the securities issued at
the equilibrium36.
An economy such as the one we described faces two main problems: the ﬁrst one is
the cost of using the available collateral to guarantee repayments; the second one is the
diﬃculty in stimulating saving for investment opportunities that may occur in the future.
When economic agents face asymmetric information in their securities - as in section 3 -
private investment is bounded away from the optimal allocation. Given these informational
frictions, government bonds are ideal candidates to transfer wealth beyond what is provided
by private ﬁnancial contracts.
The beneﬁcial role of government debt is therefore rooted in the observation that there is
limited asymmetric information (one is tempted to say none) about it. This makes govern-
ment bonds highly liquid casting them as an additional instrument to transfer wealth from
the “unconstrained” present to the “constrained” future. Since future entrepreneurs (i.e.
present consumers/lenders) will be borrowing constrained, they ﬁnd it convenient to pur-
chase government bonds as an (informationally eﬃcient) store of value. Government bonds
are not needed for consumption smoothing but only because they provide an extra store of
wealth: they imply a substitution between current consumption and future investment, a
substitution that current consumers (i.e. future entrepreneurs) are willing to accept. We
will show that the stock of government debt has two eﬀects on the entrepreneurs choice:
ﬁrstly, it provides additional sources of funding, qualitatively comparable to private endow-
ment, thus allowing the issuance of more securities (leverage eﬀect); second, it builds an
incentive for entrepreneurs with the better technology i to abandon the pooling equilibrium
issuing more liquid securities (liquidity eﬀect).
The intuition for the liquidity eﬀe c to fg o v e r n m e n td e b tr e l a t e st ot h ef a c tt h a te n -
trepreneurs with better quality technology face a binding collateral constraint. Remark 1
observed that when the collateralization constraint is not binding, there is no reason why
good quality entrepreneurs would stick to the pooling. If government debt is enough to
release the collateral constraint of good quality entrepreneurs, then the pooling equilibrium
breaks down and liquid separating equilibria emerge. Therefore, in the presence of asym-
metric information, government debt has two eﬀects on the investment decisions of ﬁrms,
the second of which is a novel contribution of this work.
6 Government Debt: Formal Analysis
It was argued earlier that it is in the interest of t =1entrepreneurs (i.e. t =0lenders) to
move their wealth from the unconstrained t =0to the constrained t =1 . I will now formally
illustrate how government debt (GB) provides an additional instrument to crowd in private
investment. The existence of asymmetric information is the reason why the arguments here
are at odds with Diamond (1965).
36The reader may recognize the similarity between my argument and Cass and Yaari (1966).
32Government borrows issuing bonds with the following two crucial characteristics: (1)
there is no associated collateral, (2) there is no informational asymmetry about GB (for
simplicity but without loss of generality). Thus the government issues D0 bonds at t =0
and repays them at t =2raising lump sum taxes (T). Each unit of GB pays 1 unit of the
consumption good in both contingencies at t =2 .A tt =1 , the government does not issue
new bonds and agents can exchange the GB they hold. I denote by Dh
1 the units of GB
purchased by an agent at t =1 . Dh
t and Th have to be viewed as, respectively, agent h’s
GB and tax payment. D0 is the aggregate GB issued. Observe that GB is purchased only
by non entrepreneurs at both t =0and t =1 . Finally, t =0purchase of GB reﬂects the
desire of potential entrepreneurs to transfer wealth to t =1 , thus relaxing the collateral
constraint they then face.
In order to formally illustrate the argument, I will refer to the basic model introduced
in Section 3. All the previous assumptions are maintained - in particular (A.1), i.e. the
probability of the G(ood) contingency is p<1/2 - but for the individual budget constraint,
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D represents the share of h holdings of GB that are resold at t =1 ;i ts a t i s ﬁes:
0 ≤ γh
D ≤ 1 iﬀ Dh
0 > 0 (17)
since individuals can not resell more GB than they have.
The equilibrium is deﬁned as in Section 2.2 but for the additional equilibrium conditions
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33We then recall that (1) individual endowment w is large enough to guarantee consumers
with positive consumption after the purchase of private securities; moreover we assume (2)
whatever the government raises at t =0through the issuance of bonds is immediately
discarded, i.e. public expenditure is completely wasteful. The ﬁrst assumption is aimed
at ruling out that the simple introduction of GB per se decreases private investment. The
second assumption is made for simplicity: with asymmetric information equation (6) says
that investment is constrained at a point where marginal productivity is greater than 1
for all good quality entrepreneurs. Therefore, increasing investment means increasing the
expected value of aggregate endowment in the economy. But then, to the extent that
the introduction of GB is able to increase the aggregate level of investment chosen by the
private sector, it is always possible to design an optimal transfer scheme across individuals
such that welfare is in fact improved. In order to simplify our argument we will abstract
from such transfer scheme and we will talk about GB neutrality and non neutrality simply
focusing on its eﬀect on private investment. Nonetheless, the reader should keep in mind
that increasing investment is, in this context, suﬃcient to increase welfare, once the correct
transfer scheme is assumed.
The derivation of equilibrium prices for GB is simple37. By the provided informational
assumption on GB, the t =1GB price is:
qD
1 =1
while the t =0GB price is proven in the appendix to satisfy:
qD
0 > 1
since GB provides not only a payoﬀ at t =2but a liquidity service at t =1 . This service
is positively priced because the possession of GB at t =1allows entrepreneurs to relax the
borrowing constraint. The price is thus strictly larger than 1, the expected delivery of GB.
First it is necessary to clarify that the beneﬁcial role of GB is due to the presence of
entrepreneurs private information. In order to clarify this fact, I prove that positive GB has











NoGB denote, respectively, the individual consumption of
consumers (purchasers of securities) at t =0and t =1and recall that that they both are
s t r i c t l yp o s i t i v eb ya s s u m p t i o no nπ0 and π1. Moreover we assume that the endowment,w,i s

















So we can state:











1 − π0 = measure of t =0consumers
37As usual I refer the reader to the relevant part in the appendix for details.
34qD
1















π1 (1 − π0)= measure of t =1entrepreneurs
1 − π1 (1 − π0)= measure of t =1consumers
then GB has no eﬀect on private investment in the economy with symmetric information.
Proof. We observe: (1) at t =0the eﬀe c to fG Bo ni n v e s t m e n ti sn i li ft h i si ss m a l l e rt h a n




¢∗ is such that marginal productivity
is equal to 1 without GB. Since the GB rate of repayment, delivery over market price, is
equal to one, its addition does not increase the incentive to invest of entrepreneurs.
The intuition is simple: in the symmetric information economy GB does not improve
the terms at which entrepreneurs may ﬁnance investment. Therefore they have no incentive









The case of the economy where entrepreneurs are privately informed about the tech-
nology and security they own is of interest here. In order to illustrate the beneﬁcial role
of GB for private investment under this scenario, it is convenient to start from the case
in which the government issues a small amount of GB, i.e. D0 = η>0,w i t hη small.
The introduction of GB has two eﬀects at t =1 38. First, it relaxes the collateralization
constraint since it provides entrepreneurs with sources of funding qualitatively comparable
to private endowment, thus decreasing the use of less convenient ways to fund investment
like the resale market (leverage eﬀect); second, to the extent that the GB is able to make
the collateralization constraint not binding, Remark 1 ensures that GB provide an incentive
for entrepreneurs with the better technology i to abandon the pooling equilibrium and issue
liquid securities. In the latter case the economy moves toward a liquid separating equilib-
rium and we deﬁne this eﬀect of GB liquidity eﬀect. In fact, adapting (10) to the account
for (17), individual investment at t =1becomes:
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Before the introduction of GB, two scenarios were possible. In the ﬁrst scenario, entrepre-
neurs resell only low quality securities in their portfolio, i.e. γh
j0,i,π1 =0 , and thus adding
GB Dh
0 unambiguously increases the investment level Ii
1, given the issuance of security j at
t =1 ; in the second scenario, entrepreneurs resell all their low quality securities and part
of their high quality ones, i.e. 0 <γ h
j0,i,π1 ≤ 1. In the latter case the introduction of GB
implies that entrepreneurs substitute funds raised by the costly resale of private securities,
with funds raised reselling GB: since all entrepreneurs act similarly, the price of private
securities in the resale market falls with an overall ambiguous eﬀect on the level of invest-
ment. Notice however that the eﬀect on the level of investment is guaranteed to be positive








38T h er e a d e rs h o u l dk e e pi nm i n dt h a ti ft h ei s s u eo fG D is smaller than individual private consumption






0,1−π0,t h e r ei sn oe ﬀect over t =0investment.
35i.e. if the funds raised by reselling GB are larger than the fall in the amount raised by
selling low quality securities and the total amount raised by reselling the given share of high
quality securities. Since Dh
0 is an exogenous policy variable, one can always set it to satisfy
(20) as long as D0 satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 7. This illustrates the reasoning
behind the beneﬁcial leverage eﬀect of GB.
The second eﬀect of GB, the liquidity eﬀect,i d e n t i ﬁes the pressure that the introduction
of GB creates over optimal security design. To illustrate this argument in a formal way, it
suﬃces to increase continuously GB. As more GB is introduced, the t =1collateralization















and j = j
where entrepreneurs with the best technology, i, achieve the same investment level of the
symmetric information benchmark economy simply reselling low quality securities and GB
and then issuing liquid securities carrying high collateral39. This is due to the fact that,
thanks to GB, entrepreneurs have enough wealth to issue securities carrying suﬃcient col-
lateral to be distinguishable and to ﬁnance the symmetric information optimal level of
investment. I summarize the discussion above by the following proposition:











0, then, even in the presence of entrepreneurs’ private information, there is a (possibly large)
class of economies for which a positive level of GB enhances t =1private investment, leav-
ing t =0investment unchanged.
One should take the argument that GB increases private investment with some care.
Naturally the stock of GB that relaxes the collateral constraint must be compatible with the
conditions of Proposition 7. If this conditions are not satisﬁed, it is not always possible to
issue the stock of GB that achieve the optimal level investment at t =1without decreasing
the level of investment at t =0 . Not withstanding this issue, one can nonetheless observe
that there is a large class of economies where the introduction of GB increases investment
and thus, under the optimal transfer scheme, welfare.
7 Liquidity and Financial Arrangements
This section addresses the role that ﬁnancial markets have in fostering the equilibrium
level of liquidity of the economy. In particular, I will focus on the beneﬁcial role of a well
known feature of developed ﬁnancial system: financial pyramiding, or simply pyramiding.
Financial pyramiding is the ﬁnancial arrangement allowing an agent to borrow using not
only his physical assets but also his ﬁnancial assets, as collateral. This possibility - as I will
argue - is especially relevant for ﬁrms seeking to raise funds through competitive ﬁnancial
39Af o r t i o r ido entrepreneurs endowed with the worse technology i.
36markets. I hereby illustrate how pyramiding can have an important role in aﬀecting the
equilibrium level of investment.
The issue revolves around this simple fact: it is impossible for a security purchaser
to observe the real value of the securities held by each entrepreneur. When agents are
privately informed about the value of the securities they hold, pyramiding has a wide scope:
in fact it works as an instrument to reduce the cost of reselling high quality securities and
allows entrepreneurs to shift up the level of investment. Pyramiding, by fostering securities
creation, ameliorates the informational asymmetry present in the resale market, where the
equilibrium price is between the expected delivery of the worse and better securities and so
high quality securities are, in our terminology, illiquid. When the illiquidity of good quality
securities is suﬃciently poor, I will show that owners of high quality securities are better
oﬀ over-collateralizing new securities using old ones as collateral and forego the liquidity
premium high quality securities are charged in the resale market.
In the present context I allow entrepreneurs to use the securities they own as collateral
for the issuance of new securities - now with ﬁnancial collateral- instead of just reselling
them in the market.
7.1 Equilibrium with Financial Pyramiding: the Formalization
The core of the issue lies in the liquidity premium borne by any agent who wishes to resell
high quality securities, i,a tt =1 . This premium is positive only if a pooling equilibrium
is present in the security market at t =0 . Otherwise, there is no beneﬁtf r o mﬁnancial
pyramiding as deﬁned here.
Allowing the issuance of new securities backed by ﬁnancial collateral does not, by itself,
solve the informational asymmetry. In fact, by (A.2) and (A.3), the buyer of a security
remains unable to screen the quality of collateral, even if this ﬁnancial. But now, when
at t =2the actual value of the ﬁnancial collateral is revealed, the securities backed by
ﬁnancial collateral pay oﬀ the minimum between 1 and the value of the ﬁnancial collateral.
This means that anytime the value of the securities used as collateral exceeds the face value
of the promise they back, the diﬀerence is retained by the borrower, not the lender. It goes
without saying that this improves the use of good quality securities as an instrument to
raise funds at t =1 . Financial pyramiding diﬀers from simple resale: when an agent sells
the high quality securities in his portfolio he transfers the "value" of a security at a price
strictly smaller than the security’s expected delivery.
Decreasing the burden of asymmetric information on agent’s portfolio, ﬁnancial pyra-
miding improves the funds available to t =1entrepreneurs and reduces the severity of
adverse selection. In order to illustrate the argument formally, I will refer to the basic
model introduced in Section 3. All the previous assumptions are maintained - in particular
A.1, i.e. the probability of the contingency G(ood) is p<1/2 - but for two: the security
structure and the individual budget constraint.
• The security structure is the same as before but for the fact that at t =1securities
where collateral is a ﬁnancial asset can now be issued. I will identify each of these new
securities by jp(j),w h e r ejp(j) denotes the number of units of the ﬁnancial contract


















k/1010 : k ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ 10100ª
When the collateral is “ﬁnancial”, the structure is very similar to the case when
the collateral is physical: the delivery in contingency s (Djp(j)(s)) is the minimum
between the face value (1) and the actual delivery of the securities used as collateral
(Di
j(s)jp(j)).
• The budget constraint,
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1(jp(j,i)) denote, respectively, the long and short positions of h while
q1(jp(j)) labels the market price of the security having jp units of security j as collateral. It
is important to observe that the only change in the budget constraint takes place for t =1
and t =2 . This is natural since the resale market is present at t =1only and at t =2all
securities pay oﬀ.
Similarly to the case of securities with physical collateral, the corresponding collateral
constraint for ﬁnancial contracts backed by securities is:

















0(j,i) > 0, ∀j
(FC)
The interpretation is simple: no agent can use as ﬁnancial collateral more securities than the
ones he previously purchased and does not resell at t =1 . It is obvious that an entrepreneur
can not resell the same security he is using as collateral.
In section 3.4 I have argued that, under fairly general conditions, t =0equilibrium
is pooling in the security space, i.e. diﬀerent entrepreneurs issue securities with the same
38collateral level. This case only is of interest here. At t =0we have proved that, if the
equilibrium is pooling, each entrepreneur issues security j = 1
1+λH a n do n l yo n es e c u r i t yi s
present in the resale market at t =1 .





units of any security never
defaults. Security i with physical collateral j = 1
1+λH pays, in contingency s = B, 1−λH
1+λH.
But then, even if security jp(j)=1+λH
1−λH was backed only by securities (j,i), it would always
pay 1 and would never default. Therefore, security jp(j)=1+λH
1−λH is constructed in a so that
it is payoﬀ invariant to the quality of the underlying collateral. Thus securities i will always
be resold and never be used as collateral to other securities. An agent who wishes to raise
funds through good quality securities (i) has the opportunity to use ﬁnancial pyramiding













since q1(jp(j)) = 1 at jp(j)=1+λH
1−λH > 1
(22)
Equation (22) states that the price obtained reselling one unit of the high quality security,
i.e. qR
1 (j), is larger than what can be raised using the same security as collateral for the new
security jp(j)=1+λH





. This does not mean though that resale
is preferred to ﬁnancial pyramiding since resale, contrary to pyramiding, implies that the










> 0 for each security.
The possibility of ﬁnancial pyramiding is inconsequential for consumers since they have
no need to reallocate their consumption between today and tomorrow. It is instead im-
portant to collateral constrained entrepreneurs because it allows a more eﬃcient use of the
wealth they own through securities i. Without loss of generality we focus therefore on
entrepreneurs in order to establish when ﬁnancial pyramiding is beneﬁcially employed to
increase investment. Readapting (10), we have:
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Equation (23) highlights ﬁnancial pyramiding as an alternative way of funding but it can
n o tb eu s e dt op r o v et h a tﬁnancial pyramiding increases t =1private investment. In order
to do so it suﬃces to observe what share of high quality securities, γh
j,i,π1,i sr e s o l di nt h e
absence of ﬁnancial pyramiding. If this share is small (e.g. γh
j,i,π1 ≈ 0), it means that
the resale of securities i was perceived by entrepreneurs as too costly. In this case the
introduction of ﬁnancial pyramiding allows to use all the high quality securities that had no
role before and then increases private investment. One can check this intuition of how the
introduction of ﬁnancial pyramiding increases private investment simply recasting (23) and
39(10) when γh
j,i,π1 ≈ 0, which implies qR






, and keeping in mind that γh
j,i,π1 =1 :
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Then, at t =1 , reselling high quality security (j,i) is strictly dominated by using them
as ﬁnancial collateral. Therefore, there is a (possibly large) class of economies in which
entrepreneurs are restrained from reselling their high quality securities but use them as
ﬁnancial collateral whenever possible. To summarize, this class of economies presents the
following two features in the equilibrium with ﬁnancial pyramiding: ﬁrst, only low quality
securities are traded in the resale market and thus the market price remains equal to their







; second, all high quality securities are used as
collateral in the issuance of securities jp(j)=1+λH
1−λH which are liquid since their price is
equal to their expected delivery. Since entrepreneurs leverage themselves as much as they





















which is strictly larger than (11) under the assumption that γh
j,i,π1 ≈ 0 in the absence of
pyramiding.
Notice ﬁnally the two main implications of our discussion. First, ﬁnancial pyramiding
decreases adverse selection at t =0 : increasing the liquidity of high quality securities at
t =1 , their price at t =0also increases. In particular the price of securities issued by better
technology i will increase while the price of securities issue by worse technology will decrease,
ameliorating adverse selection. Second, ﬁnancial pyramiding enhances the robustness of a
pooling equilibrium at t =0since it decreases the liquidity cost of high quality securities.
Because of the possibility provided by ﬁnancial pyramiding, the market is able to screen
and distinguish good over bad quality securities. In fact, anyone reselling a security at t =1
- instead of borrowing using it as collateral - must be trading a low quality ﬁnancial asset
while high quality securities will always be used as collateral in the successful attempt to
diﬀerentiate themselves.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The main purpose of this paper has been to propose an integrated answer to the question
of what determines the equilibrium level of liquidity of an economy. This answer has
been advanced through a general equilibrium characterization of the notion of liquidity
and its determinants. The latter include the nature of the optimal security design in the
40private sector, the presence of government debt, and the available ﬁnancial arrangements. I
measured the liquidity of a security via an informational asymmetry concerning the value of
the collateral attached to it. The informational asymmetry is responsible for the illiquidity
of a security because it may generate a discrepancy between current market prices and actual
(discounted) future values. Then I related the liquidity of a security to its suitability in
ﬁnancing private investment. In this way the equilibrium level of liquidity became a crucial
factor in the allocation of credit, and thus private investment, in a production economy.
The general equilibrium analysis yields the following main implications. First, it shows
that illiquidity is an equilibrium phenomenon of the economy. Firms take into account
the state of the economy when they decide what kind of security to issue: how often
their securities default and how serious this default is. Even allowing this freedom, this
study argues that ﬁrms may tend to issue very similar securities. So a pooling equilibrium
emerges in the security space. Pooling equilibria become moreover robust to oﬀ-equilibrium
expectations when the share of good entrepreneurs in the economy is suﬃciently large. The
existence of pooling equilibria is identiﬁed with the illiquidity of the economy.
Applying our study to the positive relation between the business cycle and liquidity, we
argue that security endogeneity should not be ignored to construct a realistic analysis. This
aspect, sidestepped in the literature, seems to play an important role in a world where ﬁrms
actively react to the state of the economy. I show in Section 4 how it is possible to reconcile
an explanation of procyclical liquidity with the fact that ﬁrms optimally select the security
they issue.
Secondly, I reinterpret government bonds, via their ability to provide liquidity to the
economy, as encouraging rather than crowding out private investment. This seems impor-
tant given the special attention government debt has received in the recent policy debates
when the US public debt seemed headed toward full repayment. This attention results
from the underlying conviction that government debt provides ﬁnancial markets with some
important services and, among these, the enhancement of the level of “liquidity” in the
economy. Here I have provided a precise interpretation of this notion arguing that the
stock of government debt has two eﬀects on private investment: ﬁrst, it provides an ad-
ditional store of value, besides private securities, which, releasing the collateral constraint
of entrepreneurs, allows the issuance of more securities (leverage eﬀect); second, it builds
an incentive for entrepreneurs with the better technology to issue securities with higher
collateral level and abandon the pooling equilibrium so moving the economy toward liquid
securities (liquidity eﬀect). Therefore, in the presence of asymmetric information, I have
showed that government debt may increase private investment through two channels, the
second of which is, to our understanding, a novel contribution.
Thirdly, given our well deﬁned notion of collateral, I have argued that the liquidity of se-
curities retraded in the resale market is endogenously enhanced by some of the arrangements
available within ﬁnancial markets. Financial markets are not passive and develop arrange-
ments trying to enhance the level of liquidity of an economy: allowing for the possibility
of using other ﬁnancial contracts as collateral, they tackle the informational asymmetry
present anytime securities are retraded. Therefore they provide entrepreneurs with a more
convenient way to "mobilize" the wealth stored in the private securities of their portfolio.
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9A p p e n d i x
9.1 Individual Maximization


















































































































t (j)j ≤ Ih
t (PC)
0 ≤ γh
ji ≤ 1 iﬀ θh
0(j,i) > 0 (RC)
This problem is equivalent to the following where the subsctipt πt accounts for the
diﬀerent timing in investment opportunities. One must keep in mind that, stating the
individual problem, agents distinguish between contingency π0 (π1) at t =0( t =1 )when
they face an investment opportunity and contingency (1 − π0)[ ( 1 − π1)] when they do
not. By the same token, the same distinction must be accounted for when one writes the
individual problem for t =2 .














































































































































































































































t = multiplier for period t budget constraint
νh
t = multiplier ch
t non negativity constraint
βh
t = multiplier for CC(t)
δ
h
ji = RC multiplier upper bound for contract j, technology i
δh
ji = RC multiplier lower bound for contract j, technology i
Accounting for the fact that when agent h has an investment opportunities he borrows
and invest40 and when he does not produce he lends and consumes, one obtains the following
FOCs:













































































































2s(k), k = π1,1−π1,i se q u a lt oPr(s), irrespective of k, since consumption
is positive in each contingency of t =2and ∀h. Equilibrium investment at t =1for the
entrepreneur is given by:
Ii












































469.1.2 Theorem 2: Existence of Robust Pooling Equilibrium jpool = j
The proof of the theorem is divided into few intermediate steps.
The general argument is organized as follows: ﬁrst I characterize what conditions must
be satisfed by the optimal security/ies; second, I characterize the set of pricing functionals
consistent with the existence of pooling equilibria; ﬁnally, I show that there is a pricing
functional in this set robust to any oﬀ-equilibrium perturbation.
Lemma 1 The optimal security for entrepreneur endowed with technology i is the one solv-
ing the following problem:















































1 (j − q1(j)) (25)
The expression above has to be satisﬁed by any security issued in equilibrium. This condition
allows to rank diﬀerent securities from the point of view of entrepreneur i:t h e o p t i m a l
security/ies minimize the RHS of the previous equation, i.e. its marginal cost. To determine
the value of βi
1, one multiplies both sides by ϕi













































































































































47In conclusion, ﬁnding the optimal security for entrepreneur i is equivalent to minimize the
R H Si n( 2 7 ) :






















Lemma 2 When p<1/2, technology L is ranked superior to technology 1.G i v e n t h e
production function g(.),i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd an open set of economies characterized
by a suﬃciently large share, η(L), of better technology entrepreneurs in the economy, i.e.
1 ≥ η(L) ≥ (η(L))
∗ such that the set of pricing functionals supporting the pooling equilibrium








≤ q1(j) ≤ q1∗(j)
ª
Proof. The objective of this lemma is to derive the pricing functionals that support the
pooling equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs issue security j only. Such functionals make
technology “1” entrepreneurs - the worse technology - at most indiﬀerent between issuing
security j = jpool and any other while technology “2” - the better one - entrepreneurs
strictly prefer j = jpool.
Formally, the previous lemma has proved that j = jpool is selected by entrepreneur with
technology i if j ∈ argminj∈   J Φ[i,j],a sd e ﬁned in (28). Therefore, in order for a pricing





≤ Φ[i,j], ∀j ∈ b J










= Φ[H,j], ∀j ∈ b Jw o r s e technology entrepreneur
(29)
The ﬁrst step of the argument is the characterization of the pricing functionals qH∗(j)
and qL∗(j) that make, respectively, entrepreneurs “H” and “L” indiﬀerent. Thus, qi∗(j) is


































Notice that Ci =
£¡
Ii

























1) is computed taking into account that entrepreneur i is issuing only security j.S i n c e
48this is the equilibrium we are looking at, the choice is not arbitrary and Ci is treated as a
constant when j changes.
Rephrasing (29), we can immediately observe that, in order to support the pooling
equilibrium, it is suﬃcient to prove that the price increase that keeps technology “A”
entrepreneur indiﬀerent must make technology “L” entrepreneur strictly worse oﬀ if he
chose security j>j .T h e s u ﬃciency comes from the fact that the starting point of the
pricing functionals qH∗(j) and qL∗(j) is the same pooling equilibrium price:
qH∗(j)=qL∗(j)=q1(j) (30)
where q1(j) is the pooling security price as determined by rational expectations given the





























If q1(j) provides the “intercept” of qH∗(j) and qL∗(j), it is still necessary to determine
their slopes. These slopes play a fundamental role in our argument. In fact, we have already
observed that the support of the pooling equilibrium requires that qL∗(j) lies above qH∗(j)
∀j ∈ b J. Graphically this results in the following:
Figure 6
I now turn to determine the explicit expressions for qH∗(j) and qL∗(j).F o r s i m p l i c i t y o f
exposition, I will divide the security space b J in three subsets:
b J1 =
n
j ∈ <+|j = 1





j ∈ <+| 1





j ∈ <+| 1
1−λL ≤ j ≤ 1
1−λH = j
o

















1+( 2 p − 1)λL, j ∈ b J1
(1 − p)(1 − λL), j ∈ b J2
0, j ∈ b J3
(31)




































The determination of qH∗(j) is easier and so we give determine right away. It is possible













































The slope of qH∗(j) thus becomes:
βH = q1(j)
£
e wH(1 − p)(1 − λH)+CH¤





so that one can write:
q1∗(j)=q1(j)+βH(j − j)=
= q1(j)+q1(j) [  wH(1−p)(1−λH)+CH]
j[  wH(1+(2p−1)λH)+CH](j − j)
(36)
Two observations can be made about qH∗(j). Firstly, βH > (1 − p)(1 − λH),i . e . t h e






, as we move toward securities with higher collateral level. If this





q1(j) is smaller or equal than j and which costs strictly more in terms of
collateral. Secondly - a consequence of the ﬁrst observation - qH∗(j) intersects the upper





,a t c o l l a t e r a ll e v e lj∗ < 1
1−λH.
The issue is slightly more involved for the pricing functional making entrepreneurs “L”
indiﬀerent, i.e. qL∗(j) and, for a better understanding of the argument, the reader is reﬀered
to Figure 5. We present qL∗(j) construction splitting the argument according to the 3
relevant regions. The argument concludes that qL∗(j) is continuous and strictly concave.




















= q1(j) [  wL(1+(2p−1)λL)+CL]
j[  wL(1+(2p−1)λL)+CL] =
q1(j)
j
T h i sm a k e su sc o n c l u d et h a tqL∗(j) >q 1∗(j) in b J1 since the slope qL∗(j) is larger than




j >q 1(j) [  wH(1−p)(1−λH)+C1]
j[  wH(1+(2p−1)λH)+C1]
• In j ∈ b J2
∂Es[DL
j (s)]
∂j falls and the “intercept” of qL∗(j) becomes qL∗( 1
1+λL).Iw i l ls h o w







































































































51Notice that, in order to keep Φ[L,j] constant, β0
L < (1 − p)(1 − λL). Therefore,
β0
L <β L.
• Finally the slope of qL∗(j) in b J3 can be easily found applying the same methodology













































which is strictly positive but β00
L <β 0
L.
The fact that β00
L <β 0
L <β L shows that qL∗(j) is strictly concave. qL∗(j)’s continuity
arises by construction. qL∗(j)’s concavity - together with qH∗(j)’s linearity over b J and the






collateral level j∗ < 1
1−λH - allows a simple methodology to determine the set of pooling
equilibrium pricing functionals. To this purpose we make the following two observations.
Firstly, along qH∗(j) entrepreneurs endowed with technology "H" are indiﬀerent between
issuing the pooling security j and any other security j<j ∗. Moreover, by (35), the slope
of qH∗(j) is increasing in the pooling price q1(j) which, in turn, increases with the measure
of entrepreneurs endowed with the better technology “2”, i.e. η(H), in the population.
Secondly, because of qL∗(j)’s concavity, the survival of the pooling equilibrium is linked
to the fact that entrepreneurs endowed with technology “L” have no incentive to deviate,
given prices, to securities with higher collateral. The absence of deviations is equivalent to
the fact that better technology entrepreneurs get higher proﬁts issuing j = jpool instead of
j∗.F o r m a l l y :
Profits(L,j = jpool) ≥ Profits(L,j∗)
Let us start observing that, when the population is made of good quality entrepreneurs
only, i.e. η(L)=1 ,w eh a v e :




























In fact, since the collateralization constraint is binding, entrepreneurs sell all the securities
they can:
IL
1 (j)=e wL + ϕ(j,L)q(j)=ϕ(j,L)j
⇒ ϕ(j,L)=   wL
j−q(j)





e wL + e wL q1(j)
j−q1(j)
´i










e wL + e wL q1(j∗)
j−q1(j∗)
´i
− e wL Es[DL
j∗]
j∗−q1(j∗)



































































− 1 > 0










we have that the inequality in (37) is strictly satisﬁe d .T h u st h ep o o l i n gi sp r e s e r v e d .T h i s
is certainly not surprising since at j = j entrepreneurs with good quality technology “L”
get a price equal to their expected delivery and issue the security entailing the least level
of collateral.
We now conclude the argument testing whether the pooling equilibrium is preserved
once the share of good quality entrepreneurs decreases, i.e. η(L) falls below 1. The fall of
η(L) has two eﬀects on the relation between Profits(L,j = jpool) and Profits(L,j∗):o n
one side, it lowers the pooling price q(j) and makes the pooling equilibrium less appealing
since Profits(L,j = jpool) decreases; on the other side, it decreases the slope and intercept
of qH∗(j) increasing j∗ and so lowering Profits(L,j∗). But since the inequality in (37) is
strict, we can argue that, by the continuity of the proﬁt function, there is always a threshold
share of good quality entrepreneurs 1 > (η(L))
∗ ≥ 0 such that the pooling is preserved.
Therefore, given the productive technology, one can always ﬁnd an open set of economies
characterized by 1 ≥ η(L) ≥ (η(L))
∗ such that the set of pricing functionals supporting the








≤ q1(j) ≤ qH∗(j)
ª
53Lemma 3 If 1 ≥ η(L) ≥ (η(L))
∗, the pooling equilibrium j = jpool is robust in the sense of
deﬁnition 2, i.e. it is the limit, for εj(n) → 0 when n −→ +∞, of a sequence of ε-economies







Proof. In order to prove the statement it is suﬃcient to focus on the case where only high
quality (L) entrepreneurs are forced to issue securities that are not part of the equilibrium.
I will present the argument in a very concise form since the reasoning is the same as Dubey
and Geanakoplos (2003):
1. consider the average quality for security j = jpool unaltered at the original level and
force an “external agent” of measure ε(n), indistinguishable to quality L entrepreneurs
in terms of security payoﬀs, to issue oﬀ equilibrium securities, i.e. securities with
collateral level j>j ;
2. after forcing the external agent to issue oﬀ equilibrium securities, the equilibrium of
the economy is determined allowing all the remaining agents to optimize. Deﬁne this
as the equilibrium of the ε(n) economy;
3. ﬁnally take ε(n) → 0, i.e. the measure of the external agent to zero. Clearly the limit
ε(∞)=0replicates the original economy. If the equilibrium of the ε(n) economy
converges to the pooling equilibrium jpool = j of the original economy, then we say
that the equilibrium survives the “external agent” perturbation. If the equilibrium
survives this perturbation in which the external agent is equivalent to quality L en-
trepreneurs only issuing oﬀ equilibrium securities, then the equilibrium survives the
perturbation in which the external agent is equivalent to any mix of good and bad
quality entrepreneurs. Thus the equilibrium is robust.
In order to prove the argument it suﬃces to show that in the ε(n) economy entrepre-
neurs with low quality technology (1) are indiﬀerent between issuing jpool = j and j 6= j
while entrepreneurs with high quality technology (L) are at most indiﬀerent, if not worse
oﬀ. To this purpose consider the choice of an entrepreneur who is issuing jpool = j and
is now facing the introduced perturbation on security j>jin the ε(n) economy. The
previous lemma observed that if entrepreneur L deviates so does entrepreneur 1 but NOT
viceversa. Therefore the equilibrium price on security j>jwill reﬂect this asymmetry and
will fall up to the point where entrepreneurs 1 are indiﬀerent. But this is the condition
necessary to support the pooling equilibrium: low quality technology holders are indiﬀerent
to issue diﬀerent security while high quality technology holders are strictly worse oﬀ.I n
eﬀect, the previous lemma guaranteed that when the share of good technology entrepre-
neurs is larger the required threshold, i.e. η(L) ≥ (η(L))
∗, the pooling equilibrium survives
the perturbation consisting by forcing only good quality entrepreneurs on oﬀ equilibrium
security.
In conclusion, since the deviations of low quality entrepreneurs is triggered by the per-
turbation consisting in forcing measure ε(n) of entrepreneurs (L) to issue j>j= jpool,t h e
54measure of entrepreneurs 1 issuing securities diﬀerent from j = jpool converges to zero as
ε(n) → 0. Thus the pooling equilibrium survives any perturbation.
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D ≤ 1 iﬀ Dh
0 > 0 (GovRC)
which is equivalent to the following, once one takes into account when h is a lender and


























D,k = GovRC multiplier upper bound for resale Government debt
δh
D,k = GovRC multiplier lower bound for resale Government debt
T h ep r o b l e mi sj u s tas l i g h tm o d i ﬁcation of the previous one. All the previous FOCs





































k = π1,1 − π1
(γh
D(k))
55Observing that, by assumption, lenders (the one purchasing securities) have strictly
positive consumption at t =0 , t =1and t =2 , one has:
qD
1 =1





0 =( 1− π1)+π1
³
μh
1(k)γh
D(k)+( 1− γh
D(k))
´
> 1
56